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Abstract
In the last 20 years, agencies and departments in the State of
California have initiated seismic vulnerability programs for
state-owned buildings with goals ranging from life safety to
reduced post-earthquake disruption. Until now, there has not
been an assessment of all state-owned buildings with the goal
of identifying and assessing the seismic vulnerability of those
buildings needed for response and recovery efforts after an
earthquake.
The California Vital Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment
Project (Cal VIVA), sponsored by the California Emergency
Management Agency (Cal EMA) and funded through FEMA,
has developed a statewide approach to assessing the
vulnerability of the state-owned building stock. Cal VIVA,
undertaken by engineering faculty at California Polytechnic
State University, San Luis Obispo, is assisting Cal EMA in
preparing for natural disasters by identifying state-owned
buildings that house critical functions and are vulnerable to
earthquakes.
The initial phase of the project included the development of a
methodology for identifying critical and vulnerable stateowned buildings. The methodology was tested with four
departments; Caltrans, Department of Water Resources,
California Highway Patrol and Cal FIRE. Later phases of
Cal VIVA will expand to additional agencies, develop
guidelines for individual departments programs and create a
state-wide reporting mechanism. A critical outcome of Cal
VIVA is to provide for a systematic basis to apply for federal
hazard mitigation funding to reduce seismic vulnerabilities of
state- owned buildings critical to response and recovery
efforts after an earthquake.

This paper will describe the process of building selection, the
pitfalls and successes, the preliminary conclusions and next
steps.
Introduction
The California Vital Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment
Project (Cal VIVA), sponsored by the California Emergency
Management Agency (Cal EMA) and funded through FEMA
is a critical part of the 2010 California State Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan also known as the State Hazard Mitigation
Plan (SHMP). The purpose of the SHMP, is to significantly
reduce deaths, injuries, and other disaster losses caused by
natural and human caused hazards in California. The SHMP
describes past and current hazard mitigation activities and
outlines goals, strategies, and actions for reducing future
disaster losses.
Cal VIVA, as part of the SHMP, has the overarching goal of
assisting Cal EMA to prepare for natural disasters by
identifying state-owned buildings that house critical functions
and are vulnerable to earthquakes. The project began in early
2011 and is due to be completed in early 2013. The project
has three main focus areas:
1) Develop a methodology to identify potentially
vulnerable state-owned and operated buildings that
are essential to response and recovery efforts after
an earthquake.
2) Test the methodology on 15 – 20 state-owned and
operated buildings. The testing process will include
seismic assessments, and upgrade concepts with
budgetary costing.
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3) Develop plans for improvements to the methodology
and recommendations regarding priorities for project
funding and development.
Cal VIVA was undertaken as a joint effort by faculty of
California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly) and staff at
Cal EMA. A Vulnerable Infrastructure Strategic Work Group
(VISWG), composed of representatives from state agencies,
planners and engineers, was established to assist with the
development of approaches for the screening of state-owned
buildings, the seismic assessment methodology and to
provide oversight of the results and conclusions.
The seismic vulnerability of state-owned buildings has been a
concern for many years. Some key programs that have
focused on this issue include the California Proposition 122,
Bonds for Seismic Retrofitting program in the 1990’s as well
as programs by individual departments and entities such as
the University of California, California State University,
Administrative Office of the Courts and the California
Department of Transportation. These have all differed from
the Cal VIVA project in fundamental ways. The Proposition
122 program was state-wide, but was not focused on essential
facilities required to provide post-disaster response services.
The program instead focused on large occupancy buildings
important to recovery efforts. Other programs have been
limited to individual departments and entities with differing
prioritization and assessment approaches.
Methodology to Identify Vulnerable State Buildings
In order to develop a methodology to identify the
vulnerability of state-owned building it was necessary to
understand the organizational structure of the State and its
internal reporting mechanisms.
There are 13 primary agencies in the executive branch of the
State with 62 departments within those agencies. In addition
to these agencies and departments there are numerous
commissions, and councils. The Department of General
Services maintains the State of California State Property
Inventory (SPI) which lists approximately 24,000 stateowned buildings, including those owned by the University of
California and the California State University. For any
specific building, SPI lists building size, location, estimated
date of construction and use. Although SPI is intended to
contain all state-owned buildings, the inventory relies on
voluntary reporting by the various state agencies and
departments, and therefore has been found to not be a
comprehensive list.
A methodology was developed to systematically review the
seismic vulnerability of such a large number of buildings. A
screening method was developed that has three triggers: 1)

Functionality, 2) Building Vulnerability and 3) Site
Seismicity.
Trigger 1 - Functionality. Initially, two types of functionality
triggers were proposed; personnel and building functionality.
The personnel functionality trigger was for State personnel
that had post-earthquake responsibilities that could be
performed at other locations. These agencies/departments
were preliminarily identified from the 2009 State Emergency
Plan (SEP). To provide appropriate resiliency, the
agencies/departments should be housed in facilities that
provide life safety to occupants and have access to back-up
facilities that would allow post-earthquake functions. Upon
investigation, it was determined that the number of personnel
and subsequent number of buildings covered under this
criterion was extremely large. This subset of the functionality
trigger was put on hold for later phases of Cal VIVA to allow
the project to focus on the critical building functionality
trigger.
The focus of Cal VIVA was the trigger: building
functionality requiring an Immediate Occupancy performance
level for essential facilities. This functionality trigger applies
to state-owned and operated facilities where operations are
considered essential during an emergency and the subsequent
recovery effort. These facilities fall into the following broad
categories: Emergency Operations Centers, utilities, and vital
records.
In order to locate such critical buildings a two-step process
was developed. First, agencies/departments would be selected
that had first responder duties after an earthquake. Second,
staff from the selected agencies/department would work with
the Cal VIVA team to develop a list of critical facilities.
Exploration of the State’s specific emergency response and
recovery plans indicated that these plans are undergoing
significant revision and were not available for review. The
State Hazard Mitigation Officer selected four departments
with critical response and recovery responsibilities to test the
Cal VIVA methodology. These four departments were
confirmed by the VISWG. Specific buildings within each
agency/department that house essential facilities were
selected based on recommendations by the respective staff.
Trigger 2 - Building Vulnerability.
The building’s
vulnerability is determined largely by its structural system
type and the structural building code provisions under which
it was designed. The most likely source for determination of
that information is the building’s construction drawings.
However there is no central state repository for the
construction drawings of state-owned buildings. Because
many of these drawings were not archived in a central
location, locating the drawings was difficult. If the building
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was inventoried in SPI only the size, location, and age of
construction was known not the type of construction.
Individual departments were often able to provide anecdotal
information as to the building’s age and type which allowed
preliminary conclusions to be drawn as to the building’s
vulnerability. This anecdotal information was used for the
second trigger. Due to the difficulty in obtaining the drawing,
the search for the building drawings did not occur until a
building met all three triggers and was designated for an
assessment.
Seismic assessments were generally not proposed for
structures which were designed to standards substantially
consistent with current building codes for essential facilities
or had been seismically upgraded to such standards.
Trigger 3 - Site Seismicity. Cal VIVA focused on buildings
located in areas of high seismicity. Buildings were selected
from geographic areas that have high seismicity as defined by
ASCE 31: SDS> 0.500 and SD1> 0.200. SPI contains the
building address and latitude and longitude. For building not
found in SPI the information was developed. Using
Geographic Information system (GIS) the building location
was superimposed on a map showing area seismicity. This
broad definition of high seismicity resulted in a large number
of buildings. For this first effort many buildings were selected
from the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas to permit
observations about area-wide vulnerability.
The use of these three triggers was reviewed by and received
concurrence from the VISWG.
Assessment Methods
Assessments of vulnerability were based on ASCE 31-03
Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings (ASCE 31) a
national standard that contains seismic assessment
procedures. The intent of choosing this method is its wide
general acceptance and its three-tiered system. The concept
was that a large number of the buildings could be rapidly
assessed as Tier 1 buildings which would provide a broad
look at vulnerability.
The ASCE 31 assessments included reviews of the original
structural drawings, site visits, the preparation of the limited
structural calculations described by ASCE 31 and the
completion of the ASCE 31 checklists. The assessments
included reviews of potential site issues and the nonstructural systems (based on site observations). The scope
included the development of upgrade concepts which were
based on the fundamental approaches of ASCE 41-06 Seismic
Rehabilitation of Existing Structures.

Consistent with the Benchmark provisions of ASCE 31 Table
3-1, seismic assessments were not performed for structures
which were designed to standards substantially consistent
with current building codes for essential facilities or had been
seismically upgraded to such standards. The use of ASCE
31, a national standard, was confirmed by the VISWG as the
assessment method for the project. In addition, based on
recommendations by the VISWG, supplemental HAZUS
analyses using the Advanced Engineering Module are being
undertaken for selected buildings. As stated on the FEMA
website, “Hazus is a nationally applicable standardized
methodology that contains models for estimating potential
losses from earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes.”
Although both ASCE 31 and HAZUS are recognized national
standards for building seismic assessment they bring different
information to the project. HAZUS will provide additional
information including damage state probabilities rather than
the compliant or not-compliant results of ASCE 31.
Vulnerable Infrastructure Strategic Work Group
The creation of the VISWG was an important component of
the project. The VISWG was formed to assist with the
development of approaches for the screening of state-owned
buildings, the seismic assessment methodology and to
provide oversight of the results and conclusions. Members
were selected that had both technical and policy backgrounds
allowing for input on both aspects of the Cal VIVA project.
The VISWG includes representatives from applicable State
agencies as well as experienced engineers and planners from
private practice. The VISWG held several meetings in 2011
and will meet again in 2012. The VISWG confirmed the
methods for selecting buildings and for their assessment and
provided valuable comments and recommendations. The Cal
VIVA team is grateful for their participation.
Selection of Department Buildings for Assessment
Challenges were encountered in selecting facilities for
assessment from the inventory of state-owned buildings. One
was that the state response and recovery plans were not
available, limiting a test of Trigger 1 - Functionality. As a
workaround, the State Hazard Mitigation Officer selected the
four departments. The selections of the four departments
were confirmed by the VISWG.
It was difficult to systematically use Trigger 2 - Building
Vulnerability since drawings for many buildings were not
archived in a central location and were difficult to locate. By
working
with
individuals
from
the
selected
agencies/departments who had in-depth knowledge of their
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building stock, it was possible to focus efforts on critical
buildings.

A map of California showing seismicity and Caltrans district
TMC/EOCs and Alternate EOCs is shown in Figure 1.

Trigger 3 - Site Seismicity was successfully applied with the
selection of buildings in areas if high seismicity.
The four departments chosen to test the Cal VIVA
methodology are: California Department of Transportation
(Caltrans), with responsibility for post-earthquake
transportation; California Highway Patrol (CHP), also with
responsibility for post-earthquake transportation; California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal FIRE), with
responsibility for fire response coordination; and California
Department of Water Resources (DWR), with responsibility
for the state water project.
In each department, contact was made with a designated
representative. This representative assisted with the selection
of buildings, obtained drawings, and provided access to the
buildings being assessed. These were often not easy tasks
and the Cal VIVA team is grateful for their assistance.
The selection of buildings to be assessed was based on the
three triggers described above: functionality, building
vulnerability and site seismicity. The buildings selected with
each department’s recommendations are described below.
California Department of Transportation.
Caltrans is
composed of twelve districts. Each district contains a
building that houses a Traffic Management Center (TMC)
and an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Each district
also has a building designated as an Alternate Emergency
Operations Center (Alternate EOC). Of the twelve districts,
approximately seven include areas of high seismicity.
Because of the intent to primarily assess buildings from the
San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, Districts 4 and 7 were
selected. The facilities in these two districts include a variety
of ages and structural types.
Two facilities were chosen in District 4. The District 4
TMC/EOC is a fifteen-story building, located in Oakland. It
was constructed in approximately 1992 recently received a
seismic upgrade. The District 4 Alternate EOC is a onestory building built in the 1960s in Walnut Creek.

Figure 1 Caltrans District EOC & TMC Locations
California Highway Patrol. The CHP is composed of eight
districts and operates approximately 100 Area Offices
throughout California. They are typically one-story buildings
with floor areas of 10,000 to 15,000 square feet.
Construction is a mix of CMU, tilt-up concrete or wood walls
generally with wood roof framing. Eight area offices were
selected, three in the San Francisco area, two on the Central
Coast and four in the Los Angeles area. The ones selected
were designed in the 1960’s and early 70s and are
representative of the building stock.

Two facilities were chosen in District 7. The District 7
TMC/EOC is a four-story building located in Glendale. It
was designed to meet essential facility code provisions and
was completed in 2006. The District 7 Alternate EOC is a
one-story building located in Commerce and designed in
1988.
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A map of California showing seismicity and CHP Area
Offices is shown in Figure 2.

A map of California showing seismicity and DWR pumping
and pumping-generating plants is shown in Figure 3

Figure 2 CHP Area Office Locations
Figure 3 DWR Plant Locations
Department of Water Resources. The DWR operates 20
pumping plants and four pumping-generating plants that
supply water to approximately 25 million Californians. The
pumping plants and pumping-generating plants are typically
large structures with three to four stories below grade and a
high bay superstructure. They were primarily built in the
1970’s with some undergoing expansions in the 1990’s. Five
facilities were selected on the basis of seismicity and
importance as determined by DWR staff.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. Cal
FIRE operates a variety of facilities throughout the state
including fire stations, lookout towers, communications
facilities, headquarters and command centers. The state is
divided into 21 areas, each with a unit headquarters and a
command center. There are North and South Region
Headquarters, located in Redding and Fresno. Many of the
unit headquarters and command centers were replaced in the
1990’s and were designed to essential facility status so are
assumed to be compliant. Several older facilities are slated
for replacement in the near future. The four candidate
facilities in Mendocino County being considered for
assessments based on their age and area seismicity are a unit
headquarters, command center, air attack base and helicopter
attack base.
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A map of California showing seismicity and Cal FIRE
headquarters is shown in Figure 4.

be effectively used as Hazus input. Currently the Cal Poly
team is developing a Hazus Advanced Engineering Building
Model for CHP that will be used to estimate average annual
loss and annualized causalities.
Summary of Assessment Results
A total of 17 buildings from three departments have been
assessed to date: four Caltrans buildings, five DWR buildings
and eight CHP buildings. The assessments of the Cal FIRE
buildings are pending.
As specified by ASCE 31, the assessments included reviews
of the original structural drawings, site visits, the preparation
of structural calculations and the completion of ASCE 31
checklists, including those for site hazards and non-structural
systems.
Some of the facilities underwent a Tier 1
assessment, some a Tier 2. The project scope also included
the preparation of upgrade concepts and budgetary costs. The
results for each department are summarized below.
California Department of Transportation. Caltrans is in the
process of upgrading their TMC/EOC facilities and the
Oakland and Glendale buildings are two examples of several
such buildings.

Figure 4 Cal FIRE Headquarters Locations
Hazus Evaluation
As work continued on Cal VIVA it became evident that the
methodology was valid, but the bottoms-up approach of
looking at individual buildings within the context of an
extremely large number of buildings meant a lengthy process.
The Cal VIVA team felt that other options should be
explored. One option is the use of Hazus, a methodology that
estimates potential losses from earthquakes, floods, and
hurricanes. Hazus uses Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) technology to estimate physical, economic, and social
impacts of disasters.

The District 7 TMC/EOC is located in a four-story steel
framed building located in Glendale. The drawings state that
the structural system as well as the bracing and anchorage of
non-structural elements were designed to provide compliance
with essential facility code provisions for a fixed base
building. Prior to construction the building design was
apparently modified and constructed with a seismic isolation
system. The site visit confirmed the general construction of
the building, the general compliance of non-structural
components and that the detailing of building systems at the
plane of isolation could accommodate the specified
movement. On this basis the building meets the requirements
for an immediate occupancy facility.
A photo of the building housing the District 7 TMC/EOC is
shown in Figure 5.

While working on the assessments of the buildings within
each department patterns of building types started to emerge.
Specifically it was noted that the critical area offices for
CHP, which number over 100, have strong similarities in
basic ages and building type. This observation indicated that
information obtained from the CHP site investigations could
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the systems serving the TMC/EOC are not to essential facility
status. Further study was recommended to review these
issues.
The buildings designated as the District 4 and 7 Alternate
EOCs are older buildings that have not been upgraded as
might be appropriate for their proposed function and their
seismic performance is anticipated to be poor.

Figure 5 Caltrans District 7 TMC/EOC (photo by the
authors)
The District 4 TMC/EOC is in a fifteen-story steel moment
frame building constructed in approximately 1992 in
Oakland.
The building received a seismic upgrade,
completed in 2010, that was composed of the upgrade of
selected bays of the original moment frames and the
installation of viscous dampers. The viscous dampers were
installed in two bays along each perimeter face for the full
height of the building.
The upgrade of the existing moment frames was composed of
strengthening of the existing beam-to-column connections
and column splices. All of the bays of the original steel
moment frames were upgraded from the first through the
seventh floor and a majority of the bays were upgraded at the
levels above. The criteria set for the seismic upgrade design
was to a State of California Risk Level III with performance
goals as stated on the drawings of “minor, repairable”
structural damage and “moderate damage” with “extensive
repairs” to non-structural elements for the “Design Basis
Earthquake”. The State of California Risk Level III does not
have direct correlation with ASCE 31 or 41 performance
levels. Risk Level III lies between the Life Safety and
Immediate Occupancy performance levels and can essentially
be considered as Life-Safety plus. The existing bracing and
anchorage of non-structural elements was not upgraded.
The site visit confirmed the general construction of the
upgraded building and that the existing bracing and
anchorage of the non-structural systems appeared to be
appropriate for a normal occupancy building. Although the
seismic upgrade appears to have been well conceived and
implemented and will greatly improve the building’s seismic
performance, the upgrade criteria was explicitly not to an
immediate occupancy level and the bracing and anchorage of

The District 4 Alternate EOC, in Walnut Creek, was
constructed in the 1960s with masonry walls and steel and
wood roof framing. Following the requirements of ASCE 31,
the building was assigned a Building Type RM1 and assessed
using a Tier 1 Evaluation. The site visit confirmed the
general construction of the building and noted the bracing
and anchorage of the non-structural elements. Significant
seismic deficiencies include inadequate CMU shear walls,
inadequate diaphragms, lack of load path, lack of CMU wall
anchorage and deficient partition and ceiling construction.
The District 7 Alternate EOC, in Commerce, was constructed
in the 1980s with wood framed walls and roof. Following the
requirements of ASCE 31, the building was assigned a
Building Type W2 and assessed using a Tier 1 Evaluation.
Significant seismic deficiencies include inadequate shear
walls and inadequate load path and deficient bracing of
cabinets and equipment.
Significant upgrade measures would be required to bring
either building to an immediate occupancy status. Given the
anticipated good performance of the primary TMC/EOCs, an
Alternate EOC that is operational after a major earthquake
may not be critical.
California Highway Patrol. The CHP has undertaken a
program to replace many of the approximately 100 Area
Offices it operates throughout California. The replacement
program has been based primarily on a need for more
program space in the buildings, but the seismic vulnerability
of many of the Area Offices has been a contributing factor.
Eight area offices were selected for assessment, three in the
San Francisco area, two on the Central Coast and four in the
Los Angeles area. The three triggers described earlier,
functionality, building vulnerability and site seismicity, were
used in their selection. The Area Offices all have the critical
function of acting as staging and communications hubs.
Older buildings, designed in the 1960s and early 70s, were
selected and the locations were all of high seismicity.
The buildings are of similar size, one-story with floor areas of
10,000 to 15,000 square feet. The construction is a mix of
CMU, tilt-up concrete or wood walls with generally wood
roof framing. The structures were Building Types W2, PC1
or RM1, as defined by ASCE 31. Tier 1 Evaluations were
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used. The site visits confirmed the general construction of
the buildings and noted the bracing and anchorage of the nonstructural elements. Many of the noted deficiencies were
typical of designs of buildings of their vintage. The buildings
with CMU and tilt-up concrete walls typically had deficient
wall anchorage, diaphragms and load paths. The buildings
with wood walls typically had deficient wood shear walls.
The tall communication towers on the roofs of the buildings
were guyed with cables with uncertain or deficient
connections and deserve further review.
Recommended upgrade measures include new connections to
address the wall anchorage deficiency and new diagonal
bracing to reduce diaphragm span. The possibility of interim
upgrade measures such as strengthening wall anchorage to
reduce risk was discussed with CHP.
The seismic
assessments may result in CHP adjusting their focus for
building replacement to buildings in areas of high seismicity
and with CMU and tilt-up concrete walls.
There were also site hazards noted for most of the Area
Offices assessed with six identified using state maps showing
liquefaction potential. The liquefaction potential needs to be
confirmed by a geotechnical investigation. If the site is
liquefiable it may make some upgrades infeasible.
A photo of a typical CHP Area Office is shown in Figure 6.

consultation with DWR staff on the basis of seismicity and
functional importance.
The buildings are typically large structures with three to four
stories below grade constructed of massive reinforced
concrete sections. The below grade concrete structures
support the above grade high bay superstructures. The
superstructures include bridge cranes used to service the
pumps and other machinery. The high bay superstructures
are of structural steel construction with steel moment frames
in transverse direction and braced frames in the longitudinal
direction. The buildings were assigned Building Types C2
for the below grade structures and S1A and S2A for the
superstructures, as defined by ASCE 31. Tier 1 Evaluations
were used for the below grade structures and Tier 2 for the
above grade structures as required by ASCE 31. The site
visits confirmed the general construction of the buildings and
noted the bracing and anchorage of the non-structural
elements.
The below grade structures were determined to be compliant
with ASCE 31 with expectedly low concrete stresses. The
above grade structures were generally compliant. Stresses in
the steel members were generally acceptable. Connections,
although not fully compliant with current requirements had
generally low stresses and were generally judged to be
acceptable. Calculated drifts were less than 0.015 and were
therefore compliant. The superstructure of one pumping
plant however was non-compliant, a result of heavy precast
cladding that was not present on the other buildings.
Potential upgrade measures consisting of reinforcement of the
steel frames and member and base connections were
developed.
The bracing and anchorage of non-structural systems were
also reviewed and appeared to be generally adequate. The
non-structural systems were very extensive and further
investigation was recommended. In addition, potentially
vulnerable non-building components were observed but were
not included in the scope of this assessment. These included
the piping into and out of the facility, the switchyard and
transmission lines and roads to the facility.

Figure 6 Representative CHP Area Office (photo by
the authors)
Department of Water Resources. The facilities selected for
assessment were representative of the 20 pumping plants and
4 pumping-generating plants operated by DWR. The plants
house multiple large pump or turbine generators sets. They
were typically built in the 1970s although some were
expanded during the 1990s. Five facilities were selected in

A potential for a surface fault rupture that passes through an
outlet canal at one of the facilities was noted. The
liquefaction potential could not be determined from available
information.
With the exception of the one facility with the precast
cladding, the results of the assessments were consistent for all
facilities – compliant structures and generally good bracing
and anchorage of non-structural elements.
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A photo of a typical DWR pumping plant is shown in Figure
7.

maintenance of the vault has not been funded for years. Many
agencies/departments do not retain the construction
documents of their buildings. Using only age and building
location is only a start to understanding the seismic
vulnerability of older buildings.
The project was successful when buildings were selected with
the assistance of individual departments. The departments
were able to assist with the selection of buildings by
providing information on their functional importance and on
the building age and type. In addition, the departments
obtained drawings for the majority of the buildings and
provided access to those buildings.

Figure 7 DWR Pumping Plant (photo
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/swptoday.cfm)

from

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. Four
facilities in Mendocino County, a unit headquarters, a
command center, an air attack base and a helicopter attack
base, were selected as potential assessment candidates based
on their age and the area seismicity.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the work done to
date.
1. A methodology has been developed and successfully used
to select buildings for assessment; however, the methodology
is most effective at a department level not a state-wide level.
Because the State of California owns in excess of 24,000
buildings an approach was needed to prioritize the order of
assessment. A screening method was developed with three
triggers: 1) Functionality, 2) Building Vulnerability and 3)
Site Seismicity. Although this is a reasonable approach for
selecting buildings for assessment, application of the
methodology on a state-wide basis has encountered obstacles
in the use of Trigger 1 – Functionality and Trigger 2 –
Building Vulnerability.
It was difficult to apply Trigger 1 - Functionality, due to a
lack of access to the State’s specific plans for response and
recovery. The workaround of utilizing the knowledge of the
State Hazard Mitigation Officer was successful. Once the
department was identified it was necessary to obtain an
interagency request for assistance due to the personnel time
commitment from the chosen department.
Trigger 2 - Building Vulnerability was also difficult to use.
There is no central repository for information on structural
building system. The Department of General Services
maintains a vault of buildings documents. However,

2. The Cal VIVA project identified distinct differences
between the departments in their building stock and their
ability to respond after a major earthquake.
These
observations, summarized below, will help departments better
focus their mitigation efforts.
The Caltrans building assessments indicated that their
modern or recently upgraded TMC/EOCs should provide
good seismic performance with perhaps limited upgrade
work. Future seismic upgrades of a relatively small number
of older TMC/EOCs should provide the department with a
high level of resiliency. The same high performance was not
observed in the Alternate EOCs that were assessed. This
indicates that the Alternate EOCs should perhaps be only
relied on for local, non-seismic disasters.
The CHP buildings present a somewhat different picture.
CHP has a large stock of critical buildings and many of them
are older and are seismically vulnerable. The CHP has
embarked on a replacement program that should in time
reduce their vulnerability and provide them with a high level
of resiliency. The Cal VIVA project provided an additional
focus on the seismicity, building type and site hazards that
the CHP did not have previously.
Cal FIRE replaced many of their critical buildings in the
1990s and many of their other older buildings are scheduled
for replacement. However they still have several older
building that house critical functions. Their replacement or
upgrading should leave them also with a high level of
resiliency.
DWR provides water to 25 million Californians, clearly a
vital function. Key components of their system are the
twenty pumping plants and four pumping-generating plants
they operate.
Although many of the buildings were
constructed in the 1970’s, their seismic performance is
anticipated to be good. Further studies should focus on the
non-structural elements and perhaps on the cladding type to
see if the deficiencies noted in the one facility with precast
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cladding might occur in other buildings. The effect of the
potential surface fault rupture on one facility’s operation
should also be reviewed.
3. Site hazards were uncovered that may affect the
performance of the buildings.
Two types of site hazards were noted that may affect facility
safety and post-disaster operation. One is the potential
surface fault rupture at one DWR site. The other is the
potential for liquefaction noted at many of the CHP Area
Offices that were assessed. If the liquefaction potential is
confirmed by Geotechnical Investigations, it may affect the
feasibility seismic upgrades and alter the priority of facility
replacement.
4. Revising the Cal VIVA methodology to accommodate the
State’s organizational structure will improve the state’s
ability to implement Cal VIVA.
The State’s organizational structure is along agency and
departmental lines. The lack of state-wide building
documentation coupled with this organizational structure
suggests that a revised Cal VIVA methodology with each
agency/department taking the lead within their organization
to assess building vulnerability could be very effective. Each
department would report to a state-wide Cal VIVA system
which would serve as a central repository for the information.
This concept is being explored in a smaller follow-on Cal
VIVA project.
Increasing the resiliency of the state is a goal for all of us. In
the past, an enormous amount of work has been done in
California to reduce seismic vulnerability and improve the
safety of its citizens. That work continues today in state
agencies, counties, cities, businesses and homes across all
public and private sectors.
Unfortunately due to the
fragmented approach there is no real understanding of the
total vulnerability of the state. Utilizing methodologies such
as Cal VIVA and working together we can improve our
knowledge, work to secure funding and systematically reduce
the seismic vulnerability of California.
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